T his was reported by an inside source, September 21, 2009
Rafsanjani incorporated [into an agreed upon truce with Khamenei] reformist agendas such as re-establishment of Khatami’s standing and dignity, avoidance of further public attacks against him and other reformists, a return to mutual respect, and curbing of coup-like behavior of Sepah [IRGC]. In exchange, [the Assembly of] Experts meeting will be rather tame. [The Assembly of Experts is a governing body in the Islamic Republic with the power to supervise the performance of the Supreme Leader (as well as the power to remove him)]. But will be hearing some reformists [speak]. It [the Assembly] will produce “suggestions” as [to] a path forward, a few reminders of values, the importance of constitutional law, and the vote of people expressing their wishes. A major part of the truce is [the] traditionalists regaining power. [The traditionalists are a group of moderate conservatives that Rafsanjani is a part of, separate from the coup leaders and more hardline elements].
If all goes well, Ahmadinejad will embarrass Iran in New York [during the United Nations General Assembly meeting], which would help even more in swaying the Supreme Leader towards a gradual path to dismantling Ahmadinejad’s cabinet.
However, it seems the sermon [that Khamenei held in which he tried to moderate his tone and make concessions to the traditionalists] didn’t address all points agreed upon [in the truce], snubbing Rafsanjani and Nateq-Nouri. Rafsanjani seems very upset, especially as pressure of the Marja [senior Shia religious scholars] starts weighing on him, which could present him with a day of “either with the Marja or the regime” reckoning.
Nateq-Nouri and Rafsanjani are trying to curb the crisis, and are very concerned with a popular movement detached from reformists or Mousavi and Karoubi. It seems that the masses are simply against the regime.
There are shock-waves and shivers going through the ranks of principlists, three major factions of which are on the verge of breaking up. It looks like the principlists don’t really feel like keeping Ahmadinejad’s faction within their ranks.
Many traditional conservatives, progressive conservatives and some opportunist hard-liners don’t believe Khamenei can do anything to regain the people’s trust. This fuels internal fights.
Nothing can be predicted from here on.
Originally posted in MikVerbrugge’s Blog
